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Abstract  
This article deploys a concept of multiscalarity to criticise current theoretical approaches to 
governance and to make sense of neighbourhood governance. Drawing on Kooiman’s distinction 
between hierarchical, self- and co-governance, it is argued, first, that state strategies need to be re-
examined in the light of the multiscalarity of governance. Using the example of the neighbourhood 
and evidence from the author’s own research, the article then provides a detailed illustration of 
governance multiscalarity. The article has two notably original findings: empirically, only community 
and residents’ associations have sufficient independence to resist governmental forces on the 
neighbourhood scale (and these associations have to scale up their activities in order to have any 
chance of success); and theoretically, the societal predominance of hierarchical governance can be 
explained largely in terms of asymmetry in the conditions for trans-scalar organisation, with 
coordination from top downwards being typically easier to achieve than from bottom upwards. 
Keywords co-governance, governance, hierarchy, multiscalarity, neighbourhood, self-governance 
Multiscalarity 
Global trends from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ have opened up new questions 
about the geographical scale of decision-making. Current attempts to explain 
these trends can be classified into two groups: those that invoke state rescaling 
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strategies to improve competitiveness and regulation and those that emphasise 
‘community’-centred legitimating strategies. This article aims to evaluate these 
different explanatory approaches using a concept of multiscalarity. It argues that 
explaining governance requires particular attention to be paid to the scales on 
which governance occurs. 
Multiscalarity can be defined most simply as a property of trans-scalar action, 
or acting across more than one geographical scale. It refers to a general feature of 
social relations whereby they have different spatial reaches of interaction, which 
are related to one another in different ways. In principle, the number of scales 
could be infinite but in practice it is constrained by certain characteristics of our 
social system. 
The significance of multiscalarity for this article is that it offers a perspective 
on theories of governance. The next section will therefore consider the nature of 
governance and theories of governance. It will be shown that multiscalar governance 
is produced by complex combinations of different modes of governance 
operating simultaneously on different scales. This will be followed by a discussion 
of neighbourhood multiscalarity and neighbourhood governance, which will 
demonstrate the utility of these concepts for explaining empirical research 
findings. 
Governance 
Governance can be understood, following Le Gale`s (1998: 496), as a double 
capacity, to shape collectivities (interests, groups, organisations, places) and to 
represent them in different arenas. ‘Shaping’ is understood here in a broad sense 
to include any form of participation, whether as citizens, politicians, professionals, 
service users, service providers, and so on, that influences or otherwise 
affects the form or content of a collectivity; ‘representation’ is taken to mean any 
process whereby a person or body of people acts on behalf of a defined population. 
This conceptualisation then enables an understanding of multiscalar governance 
as involving the representation of a collectivity on one scale in an arena on 
a different scale. 
A further important concept is that of modes of governance, of which Kooiman 
(2005) has identified three: hierarchical governance, self-governance and co-governance. 
Hierarchical governance is ‘top-down’ governance in which a central 
‘governator’ dominates the shaping and representing of a collectivity. Self-governance 
is ‘bottom-up’ governance in which a collectivity is able to shape and 
represent itself. Co-governance is then where a collectivity works co-operatively 
with other collectivities, in a process of mutual shaping and mutual representation. 
In this article, the emphasis is primarily on the governance of places (spaces 
or territories – where the central ‘governator’ is typically known as a government), 
on identifying the problematic character of current theoretical approaches 
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to such governance and on finding ways to make policy and practice fairer and 
more democratic. 
One theoretical approach to governance focuses on the increasing involvement 
of non-state actors in the governance of places and attempts to explain this in 
terms of state responses, on different scales, to international capitalist restructuring 
(this approach is exemplified by Jessop, 2002, and Brenner, 2004). Such 
responses commonly take the form of state strategies, which mobilise communities 
and citizens as willing partners in providing ‘an alternative both to the 
untrammelled free market (of neo-liberalism) and the strong state (of social 
democracy)’ (Levitas, 2000: 191; see also Rose, 1996, 1999). The theorists 
argue that this involves communities and citizens in their own subjugation, by 
linking the community sector to the technocratic apparatus of the state; consequently, 
‘community organisations are shaped through their relations with the 
state and/or private foundations, lose their autonomy, and become instruments 
of state social and economic policy’ (DeFilippis et al., 2006: 680). 
Essentially, then, these theorists explain the shift from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’ as an institutional change (see, for example, Bevir, 2003), a product 
of Third Way state rescaling strategies (see, for example, Swyngedouw, 2000, 
2004; Somerville, 2004) designed to achieve greater international competitiveness 
(the ‘competition state’) and/or more effective regulation of everyday 
life (the ‘regulatory state’). They see the potentially co-governance spaces on 
a neighbourhood scale as ‘captured’ by a system of multiscalar hierarchical 
governance. 
Much evidence can be adduced in support of this theory. Rose (1999), for 
example, has described how what Habermas (1974) called ‘the public sphere’ is 
constituted and shaped by the state, which draws citizens into new fields of 
power, opening them up to new forms of disciplinary practice and professional 
or bureaucratic domination (Barnes et al., 2007: 70). Institutions of representative 
democracy function not only to legitimate state power but also to transform selfgovernance 
into hierarchical governance – notions of representation (among other 
things) are used to discipline citizens into following pre-determined state rules 
and norms (Barnes et al., 2007). Citizens are invited to participate not just in 
governmental structures (such as area committees) but also in new governance 
spaces on different scales, which arise ‘at the interface between a socially differentiated 
public and public bodies’ (Barnes et al., 2007: 164). The terms and 
conditions of their participation, however, are laid down by state officials and 
their allies, who have the power to constitute the public with which they engage, 
to set the rules and norms of engagement, to set the public agenda in many cases, 
to decide the legitimacy to afford to different voices and modes of expression, 
and to decide whether or not to take account of the views expressed (Barnes et al., 
2007: 190–1). The result is that little significant change takes place (see, for 
example, Barnes et al., 2007: 96, 130, 131). In some cases, Barnes et al. 
(2007: 192) report that the institutional rules and norms are so strongly 
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entrenched that they effectively imprison all the participants, both officials and 
members of the public. 
A classic example on a municipal scale is that of local strategic partnerships 
(LSPs) in England, where local authorities enter into partnership with representatives 
of other public services, the private sector and the voluntary and community 
sectors. It is argued that LSPs do not effectively represent the interests of the 
different sectors, because their constituencies are ill-defined and the representatives 
themselves are largely unelected (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). So, even 
though these partnerships can be more inclusive (see, for example, Maguire and 
Truscott, 2006), they can hardly be said to enhance local representative democracy. 
Indeed, Geddes (2006: 84) concludes that the effect of this shift to local 
governance is that ‘the primacy of party political debate and electoral choice 
about local policies and priorities will tend to be replaced not by deliberative, 
agonistic democratic debate, but by negotiation among a cross-sectoral local elite, 
with an inherent tendency towards a consensual, centrist, ‘‘third way’’ politics’. 
So the shift to such governance on a municipal scale is to be understood as 
involving a sideways displacement of state power to ensure more effective ‘joining 
up’ of policy and practice on this scale (part of what Peck and Tickell, 2002, 
called ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism). This does not in itself mean a diminution in the 
power of local authority councillors but only that the way in which that power is 
wielded becomes modified in the light of interaction with other sectors. In particular, 
it does not mean that local political elites will necessarily become more 
responsive to community demands, as it has long been established that, in a ‘crisis 
of representation’ (Copus, 2004), councillors will generally side with their party 
group rather than with their constituents. 
One problem with this theoretical approach is that it can appear over-deterministic, 
in the sense that it allows no room for successful resistance. In practice, 
what goes on inside the new governance spaces can be complex and the outcomes 
can be unpredictable. Consequently, not all community organisations that participate 
in governance become co-opted to state strategies and projects: ‘Some 
community organizations contest, mobilize and politicise, while others... are 
well adapted to provide services and adjust to the socio-political relations of 
the neoliberal context’ (DeFilippis et al., 2006: 680). Where publicly employed 
officials or professionals and representatives of community organisations initially 
have conflicting definitions of purpose, the latter can indeed move closer to the 
former but, by the same token, the former can move closer to the latter; for 
example where officials recognise the expertise of citizens/users/community 
activists or sympathise with their position (Barnes et al., 2007: 193–4). Local 
councillors, in particular, can act either as representatives of the council or as 
representatives of their constituents, and the gap between these two positions can 
range from being very narrow to very wide. Unfortunately, however, the theory 
does not specify a distinction between these varieties of situation, thus giving an 
impression, however unintended, that ‘resistance is useless’. 
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Given the inequality of power between government (and its partners) and most 
citizen/user/community organisations, it seems more likely that the latter will shift 
towards the former rather than vice versa. Such a shift results in the constitution 
of ‘insiders’ who may be far removed from the experience of the publics they 
may claim to represent or may be assumed to represent (Barnes et al., 2007: 195; 
see also Bang, 2005; Skidmore et al., 2006). The public becomes divided between 
a small group of ‘insider’ participants (e.g. so-called ‘community leaders’) and 
‘outsider’ non-participants in governance, with the participants becoming disproportionately 
involved in a large number of governance activities (Skidmore et al., 
2006). Some of them may even get elected to their local council. In order to be 
considered as election candidates, however, they may already have to give priority 
to party loyalty over community activism. Their best chance of getting 
elected is then through being a member of a well-known national party, which 
is unlikely to give priority to local issues. If they try to maintain a role as representatives 
of their constituents ‘against the system’, as it were, they risk finding 
themselves politically sidelined and relatively powerless – they become advocates 
rather than decision-makers. 
This risk of ‘capture’ can perhaps be avoided, however, if the representatives 
are rooted in pre-existing social movements, service user struggles, community 
activism or other alternative public spaces (for an example of successful community 
activism, see Boudreau and Keil, 2001, on secession movements in Los 
Angeles).1 Barnes et al. (2007: 202) note that where such people ‘were invited 
to participate as stakeholders in a policy or service area, deliberation was more 
likely to produce challenges to the status quo and some element of transformation, 
at least in terms of attitudes and orientations of public officials’. For 
co-governance to be effective, therefore, there need to be thriving ‘popular 
spaces’ (Cornwall and Coelho, 2004, 2006) or forums, which are autonomous 
public spaces, ‘clearly bounded from official intervention’ (Barnes et al., 2007: 
190). Where such spaces exist, there is greater potential for the agenda and rules 
of deliberation in governance spaces to be jointly constructed rather than imposed 
by officials (Barnes et al., 2007: 50).2 
The relationship between citizens/users and the state is not necessarily hierarchical, 
therefore: it can be one of co-governance (involving power-sharing 
between state and community actors) or citizens could even take full responsibility 
for public decision-making (self-governance). In order to understand better 
what is going on, however, it is necessary to specify more clearly not only the 
nature of the relationship (for example, which citizens and what power is shared 
and how) but also the space in which the relationship is embedded and the 
scale(s) on which the interactions between citizens and state take place (there 
is room for considerable diversity of social action and interaction here – see, for 
example, Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones, 2004). This article therefore focuses specifically 
on the issue of scale, arguing that hierarchical governance in particular can 
be institutionalised through a hierarchy of scales, whereby power on so-called 
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‘higher’ scales tends to dominate interaction on ‘lower’ scales, and this domination 
is achieved through the processes of shaping and representation that define 
governance itself. From this standpoint, state rescaling strategies can be viewed as 
a way of reconfiguring hierarchical governance as a hierarchy of scales, in which 
collectivities on lower scales gain representation on higher scales, but decisionmaking 
on higher scales continues to override that on lower scales. The possibility 
of self-organised shaping on lower scales explains why resistance is not 
entirely useless, while at the same time the limitations of this self-organising point 
to the strengths of this theoretical approach. 
A second kind of theoretical approach is commonly known as ‘community 
governance’. This is more normative, seeking to establish institutional criteria for 
governance that will be more democratic, more inclusive, more just, more effective, 
and so on (Clarke and Stewart, 1994, 1999). It requires local authorities in 
particular to work with citizens to ensure that they exercise collective choice to 
meet their needs and secure their well-being. It explains governance essentially on 
the basis of legitimating strategies, in which the democratising and liberating 
potential of ‘community’, on one scale or another, is invoked as a means to 
transform the economy and society. 
At least two versions of this approach can be identified: ‘new localism’ and 
‘community promotion’. ‘New localism’ (Corry and Stoker, 2002) emphasises 
local authority leadership and ‘partnership’ between elected representatives and 
local communities (e.g. Sullivan, 2001; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Smith and 
Sullivan, 2003; Stewart, 2003; Stoker, 2004). The argument seems to be that the 
‘best’ form of territorial governance, at least on a more local scale, involves 
co-governance of some kind between state and non-state actors. There are, as 
mentioned earlier, continuing problems with local (not to mention national) representative 
government, causing a lack of legitimacy (for further discussion, see 
Geddes, 2006: 82–3). To increase the legitimacy of representative government, 
therefore, new localism seeks among other things to open up local decisionmaking 
to a variety of interests that might not normally be represented, such as 
voluntary and community organisations (Geddes, 2006: 83), to create ‘alternative 
centres of democracy at the local level’ (Leach and Pratchett, 2005: 328). New 
localism also holds to a version of the European Union principle of subsidiarity, 
according to which the power to make decisions should be devolved to the 
‘lowest’ authorities that are competent to exercise it – which for most purposes 
means local authorities but, in some cases, neighbourhoods and individual 
citizens. 
New localism has been criticised, however, for misreading ‘Third Way’ state 
strategies (see for example, Cochrane, 2004). In the UK, for example, the New 
Labour Government had provided rhetorical support for the ideals of new localism 
but local authorities still do not seem to represent a privileged or even preferred 
scale of ‘community’ for public policy decision-making. Moreover, in spite 
of occasional indications to the contrary (for example, on the issue of ‘double 
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devolution’ – Mulgan and Bury, 20063 
), the New Labour Government did not 
appear to be committed to any significant strengthening of municipal power. In 
other words, where new localists see important opportunities for building cogovernance 
on a municipal scale, the nature of this possible co-governance is 
insufficiently specified and the reality looks more like the hierarchical governance 
perceived by theorists of the first kind; that is, a complex system of multiscalar 
governance integrated vertically and horizontally through Third Way rescaling 
strategies as described earlier in this article. 
Community promotion, as described by DeFilippis et al. (2006: 682), invokes 
‘community’ as ‘a form of organisation through which ordinary people can mobilise 
their interests in opposition to those of the state, or of larger global forces’ 
(Bray, 2006: 532; see also Fung and Wright, 2003, on ‘countervailing power’, 
and, for examples of such organisation, Kingsnorth, 2003, and Wainwright, 
2003). Community promotion involves seizing opportunities both for alternative 
economic development, through a range of forms of co-operative organisation, 
and for expanded democratic practice, as a result of autonomous community 
organisations challenging and negotiating with state representatives. This could 
be described as a movement for community self-governance and against statedetermined 
hierarchical governance (in short, against government). 
Such a movement has been criticised on the grounds that community 
participation is bound to be limited, relatively ineffective in solving community 
problems, under-focused on structural issues of poverty and redistribution, and 
over-focused on local or single-issue solutions (DeFilippis et al., 2006: 683–4). 
One could add that, like new localism, it insufficiently specifies the scales on 
which governance is to take place – for example, the scale on which a community 
operates is unclear and it is not stated how community promotion is to be 
scaled up to confront state hierarchies. In the absence of such specification, 
there is a risk that, instead of legitimating governance change, community promotion 
might actually reinforce the status quo, as community activists become 
recruited to local leadership coalitions (Purdue, 2005: 260). Thus, instead 
of strengthening self-governance on ‘lower’ scales, the representation of communities 
on ‘higher’ scales might have the opposite effect by increasing the 
legitimacy of the latter and, consequently, their influence and scope for 
effective action. 
It seems reasonable to argue that, in order to be equal to state multiscalar 
strategies, community participation or organisation must itself be multiscalar 
and strategic. Examples of such organisation are unusual but include ones that 
bridge the gap between community and labour and connect localised manifestations 
of social issues to larger struggles around the same or similar issues 
(e.g. living wage campaigns such as ACORN in the U.S. – DeFilippis et al., 
2006: 685–7; or London Citizens in the UK – see www.londoncitizens.org.uk or 
www.cof.org.uk). Such organisations offer examples of community action on a 
number of scales simultaneously, ranging from a small neighbourhood to a large 
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city in the case of London Citizens, with a limited capacity for national (U.S.- 
wide) action in the case of ACORN. 
In spite of their undoubted value, therefore, it can be seen that both types of 
theoretical approach discussed in this section have serious limitations as explanations 
of (territorial) governance. It is not that descriptive theory focuses too 
much on structure, thereby underestimating the power of action, or that normative 
theory places too much emphasis on action, so underplaying the significance of 
structure. Rather, it is that ‘structure’ and ‘action’ are both misrepresented by 
being abstracted from the context in which they operate. Both kinds of theory fail 
to recognise that the multiscalar character of this context is not merely incidental 
but important for explaining governance. Instead, each opts for an explanans that 
arbitrarily privileges particular scales – ‘higher’ scales in the case of descriptive 
theory, ‘lower’ scales in the case of normative theory (‘top-down’ versus 
‘bottom-up’ approaches). Consequently, they miss the point that multiscalar governance 
is produced by complex combinations of different modes of governance 
operating simultaneously on different scales. 
Hierarchical governance on a ‘higher’ scale, for example, can ‘capture’ selfgovernance 
on a ‘lower’ scale but, by the same token, self-governance on a 
‘lower’ scale can be developed to offset the power of hierarchy. It is possible, 
however, as noted by Christopoulos (2006: 773), that those operating on a 
‘higher’ scale have an advantage because they have more political capital 
(that is, access to more powerful network resources): ‘actors with low political 
capital can only hope to attain prominence by engaging in high-risk opportunistic 
actions; while actors with high political capital can be more circumspect and 
invest their more extensive resources in low-risk incremental ventures’. The concept 
of multiscalarity, as involving dynamic relations between scales, with unpredictable 
outcomes, is missing from both types of theory. Discussion of this 
concept, however, is not intended to substitute for a deeper conceptualisation 
of power and power relationships; rather, it highlights the need for such a 
conceptualisation. Power is inherently relational, and this relationality is 
expressed, in part, through multiscalarity. This point will be illustrated further 
in the next section. 
Neighbourhood Multiscalarity 
In recent years, especially in England, there has been an increasing interest in the 
neighbourhood as a site or space for urban and social activity, and particularly for 
governance activity (Taylor, 2000; Kearns and Parkinson, 2001; Sullivan, 2001, 
2002; Whitehead, 2003; ODPM, 2005; Purdue, 2005; Robinson et al., 2005; 
Hilder, 2006; Keil, 2006; White et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2007). This interest 
has, in part, been stimulated by government initiatives such as New Deal for 
Communities, now the subject of an increasing amount of critical evaluation 
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(Wainwright, 2003; Perrons and Skyers, 2004; Geddes, 2006; Wallace, 2007; 
Wright et al., 2007). A recent issue of Urban Studies, however, suggested that 
‘the neighbourhood is at best a chaotic concept’ (Kennett and Forrest, 2006: 715), 
with its use, meaning and role varying enormously across European societies. 
Suttles (1972) was perhaps the earliest scholar to suggest that neighbourhoods 
might exist on a number of different scales, for example: 
1. the scale over which children could be permitted to play without supervision 
(e.g. a small group of dwellings of some kind, such as a block of houses, part 
of a street or streets, a group of cottages/huts/trailers, et cetera) – the scale of a 
‘small’ neighbourhood (Liedholm and Lindberg, 1995); 
2. the ‘defended neighbourhood’ or ‘turf’, defined as the smallest area with a 
corporate identity distinct from other neighbourhoods (e.g. a housing estate or 
distinct part of an estate or a hamlet or village); 
3. the ‘community of limited liability’, identified with the smallest area on which 
government operates (e.g. a parish council in England, a commune in France, 
the area of a municipal district office or an area of neighbourhood management, 
a primary school or primary healthcare practitioner catchment area or a 
police beat area); and 
4. the ‘expanded community of limited liability’, identified with a sector of a city 
or a market town (e.g. a travel-to-work area, an area with distinct patterns of 
production and consumption). 
Neighbourhoods on each scale therefore have distinct geographical boundaries 
and subsets of attributes distinct to that scale. 
This conceptualisation is supported by evidence in the U.S. (Birch et al., 
1979), but research is lacking in other countries. It seems plausible to suggest 
that the form and content of the areas on each scale will vary from one country to 
another and maybe, to some extent, within individual countries. The general 
accuracy of Suttles’ typology, however, seems to be widely assumed.4 It is not 
an aim of this article to assess this assumption but rather to use the typology to 
illustrate the arguments in the previous section about the nature of territorial 
governance, to show how different scales can be mutually constitutive. 
Galster (2001) suggests that the specification of a neighbourhood is tied to the 
value of its attributes for those located in a defined territory: where a group of 
people all derive value (but not necessarily the same value) from the same attributes 
of the same area, we can call that area a neighbourhood. This suggestion 
implies that it may be possible to distinguish different scales of neighbourhood 
according to different sets of attributes valued by its residents (see Table 1). The 
nature of the attributes characteristic of each neighbourhood scale would therefore 
appear to be an issue that is deserving of more attention. On scale 1, for example, 
attributes might possibly include housing design and layout, road traffic, children’s 
play spaces, small amenity areas, immediate neighbours themselves and 
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other visitors to the neighbourhood or village, since all of these correspond to 
Suttles’ scale of unsupervised play. Physical attributes could be valued by individuals 
in terms of their quality, safety, convenience, cleanliness, and so on (see, 
for example, Hastings et al., 2005; Worpole and Knox, 2007), while the attributes 
of other people could be valued in terms of their friendliness and willingness to 
help (without being too intrusive), and generally pro-social behaviour (on neighbouring 
and neighbourliness generally, see Bridge et al., 2004; Buonfino and 
Hilder, 2006).5 Interactions on this scale do not appear to require any formal 
day-to-day co-ordination or regulation,6 though they are premised on what might 
be called a valued infrastructure of land use planning, landscape design, building 
control, highway engineering, environmental services (refuse collection and disposal, 
street cleaning, et cetera), social trust, and so on. The attributes on this 
scale, and their underpinning infrastructure, then form a background against 
which interactions occur on ‘higher’ neighbourhood scales. 
On scale 2, interaction among neighbours becomes mediated through groups, 
usually based on kinship and friendship networks, and through identities, usually 
related to status, class, race/ethnicity and age. A key attribute on this scale is the 
identity of the neighbourhood itself. There may be an element of organisation, 
such as a community association, tenants and residents association, neighbourhood 
watch group, co-operative enterprise, pub, small church or mosque or 
temple, small sports club or amenity group. 
On scale 3, there is a clear escalation of the possibilities of more institutionalised 
interaction, because it appears that key human services of health, education, 
policing and government can be delivered on this scale (for example, primary 
schools and nursery schools – Jupp, 2000). Certain private services could be 
added to this list, such as some retail services (for everyday needs) and financial 
services. Valued attributes could also include doctors’ surgeries, public transport, 
parks and gardens, neighbourhood police officers, post offices, and local council 
offices, as well as larger community organisations, religious organisations, clubs 
and amenity societies. Tims and Mean (2005, cited in Buonfino and Hilder, 2006: 
37) suggest that car boot sales, allotments and supermarket cafes are key sites for 
public interaction, although in some cases these will be scale 4 attributes. 
On scale 4, a wide range of new attributes could come into play, including 
workplaces (ideally, with decent, well-paid jobs), retailing (for occasional needs), 
Table 1 Neighbourhood scales 
Scale Identity 
Nos. of residents 
(Hilder, 2005) 
Nos. of residents 
(this research) 
1 Small group of dwellings, e.g. street/block 50–300 Less than 500 
2 Smallest named settlement 500–2,000 500–3,000 
3 Smallest governed settlement 4,000–15/20,000 3,000–15/20,000 
4 Smallest sustainable settlement Over 20,000 Over 20,000 
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secondary schools, professional sports, concert halls, night clubs, swimming 
pools, universities, and so on. This scale, however, is usually considered to be 
more ‘urban’ than ‘neighbourhood’. Above this scale it is possible to identify 
scales of city, city-region and region, but a consideration of these is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
Neighbourhood Governance 
Since a neighbourhood is a kind of place or territory, neighbourhood governance 
can be conceptualised in terms of the capacity to shape the attributes of a neighbourhood 
and to represent that neighbourhood, at least partially, in interactions 
with others. If, as argued in the previous section, neighbourhoods can be 
described as multiscalar, the possibility then arises of multiscalar neighbourhood 
governance. 
On scale 1, it seems that there is significant shaping of the neighbourhood but 
little or no representation of the neighbourhood in other arenas. Shaping is carried 
out in three main ways: spontaneously, by the everyday interactions of individual 
residents with one another and with more or less powerful people and organisations 
outside the neighbourhood; by a variety of residents’ organisations within 
the neighbourhood, such as housing co-operatives, small community associations 
and tenants’ and residents’ associations – for example, for managing a block of 
flats (Liedholm and Lindberg, 1995; Somerville and Steele, 1995: 274 – the 
so-called ‘Helsingborg model’); and by organisations from outside the neighbourhood, 
operating on a ‘higher’ scale, in which, in some cases, it may be possible to 
identify actors who are willing to champion the neighbourhood’s cause (for the 
concept of a ‘local champion’, see White et al., 2006: 245–6). On this scale, both 
the number of organisations/interests within the neighbourhood and the capacity 
to integrate them are typically low, but the task of integration and representation is 
also correspondingly small. 
On scale 2, insofar as the neighbourhood is large enough to have a distinct 
identity, there is scope for it to have its own representation in the form of a 
governance body. For self-governance, such a body could be a fully participative 
and deliberative assembly or forum in which decisions affecting the neighbourhood 
are made. This seems feasible because evidence indicates that residents’ 
attachment to their neighbourhood (which obviously requires the neighbourhood 
to have a distinct identity) is the most important factor associated with their 
participation in neighbourhood life generally, and in neighbourhood governance 
in particular (Somerville et al., 2009). The decisions involved would presumably 
include those concerning the neighbourhood’s identity (e.g. its boundaries, name, 
and key attributes) but also decisions on all the attributes on scale 1. Members of 
the body might also represent the neighbourhood to other neighbourhoods and on 
‘higher’ scales. Such representation might involve participating in decisions on 
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neighbourhood infrastructure and, more generally, acting as a voice and advocate 
for their neighbourhood.7 
On scale 3, neighbourhood governance bodies are widespread (though by no 
means universal) in most countries, in the form of primary tiers of local government 
(e.g. parish and town councils in England; communes in France). With a 
few exceptions (e.g. the famous New England assemblies – Mansbridge, 1980), 
these are bodies elected by local people rather than ones in which all citizens 
participate directly. Such representative government, however, often limits legitimate 
citizen participation in governance to the act of voting and excludes the 
bulk of citizens from decision-making processes; the link between an elected 
politician and her/his electorate is typically weak and mediated (especially on 
‘higher’ scales) by the interests of party, large corporations and the state itself (see 
Somerville, 2005). To the extent that this is so, what is potentially a form of selfgovernance 
becomes transformed into a species of hierarchical governance in 
which the elected representatives become an elite governator that dominates the 
shaping of the neighbourhood – in short, a typical form of (local) government. 
A variety of other neighbourhood organisations exists on this scale, which 
might claim to be governance bodies. Most of these, however, cannot count as 
neighbourhood governance bodies because they do not represent the neighbourhood 
as a whole. For example, a primary school governing body contains representation 
from a range of stakeholders, including parents, teachers, local business 
and its local education authority, but not from its wider neighbourhood community 
(and not usually from its pupils either!). Even a neighbourhood community 
association cannot genuinely claim to represent the whole of its neighbourhood 
unless all sections of that neighbourhood are represented in the membership of the 
association. In recent years, the number of neighbourhood bodies on this scale 
(particularly those involving partnerships between government and non-government 
organisations) has grown, in a variety of countries (see White et al., 2006). 
These bodies are typically complex insofar as they involve elements of both 
hierarchical governance (e.g. the role of the local education authority in relation 
to primary schools) and self-governance (e.g. the schools are self-managed). 
In each case, however, the collectivity that is being governed is not the neighbourhood 
as a whole but a collectivity within that neighbourhood, or else the 
governing body is not adequately representative of the collectivity it purports 
to govern. 
The distinction between urban and neighbourhood governance seems to be no 
more than a difference of scale.8 What is perhaps distinctive about the urban scale 
(scale 4), however, is the articulation of an economic dimension. This does not 
mean that economic factors are not significant on the ‘lower’ scales – of course 
they are – but it would appear to be the case that the urban scale is in some sense 
crucial for the organisation of capitalist production and consumption (Harvey, 
1982). Recent commentators have argued that this is related to the growing 
importance of state-sponsored competition among cities in a global market 
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place (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Brenner, 2004). 
A consideration of such issues, however, particularly in terms of citing examples 
of hierarchical, self- and co-governance on this scale, takes us beyond the concerns 
of the present article. 
Each mode of governance, therefore, can operate both on a single scale and 
across scales. Neighbourhood self-governance, for example, operates most clearly 
on lower scales (particularly across scales 1 and 2), where those who live or work 
in a neighbourhood shape that neighbourhood through their everyday activity and 
represent that neighbourhood to one another and to the world beyond. In contrast, 
on higher scales (3 or 4), hierarchical governance is more in evidence, with 
established institutions of government and civil society holding sway. This can 
be seen in the management of functions such as childcare, schooling, policing and 
the management of public spaces and community facilities. 
Much of the self-governance on lower scales is indeed conducted in the 
shadow of these hierarchies. For example, a community association on scale 2 
or even a parish council on scale 3 may have little room for manoeuvre in relation 
to their local or district council and its partners. A clear strength of hierarchical 
governance is its capacity to cut across scales (downwards), achieving vertical 
integration through a single hierarchical organisation; in contrast, self-governance 
has to achieve a certain degree of horizontal integration or coordination (of governance 
bodies in different neighbourhoods) before it can build across scales 
(upwards) to produce a vertically integrated or coordinated federation. 
What the argument in this section suggests is that a focus on the governance of 
places or territories can be useful for improving our understanding of the relationships 
between scales, and even of the construction of the scales themselves. 
This is mainly because of the way that such governance functions to represent a 
collectivity on one scale to a collectivity on another scale. Scales, and the links 
between them, are therefore forged, at least partly, through forms of representation. 
For example, a community forum on scale 2 might determine the identity of 
its neighbourhood on this scale9 and also make representations as appropriate to 
bodies on scales 3 and 4, such as parish councils and district councils (which are 
themselves representative bodies, so creating opportunities for co-governance). 
Understanding multiscalarity is therefore also important for understanding how 
neighbourhood governance works. 
This discussion has implications for our understanding of theories of governance. 
A consideration of neighbourhood governance alone reveals that each 
scale has its own distinctive attributes and its own articulation of modes of governance. 
Analysis of the dynamics of interaction within each scale and across 
different scales supports the argument made earlier in this article against the 
assumption of the explanatory primacy of interaction on any one particular 
scale. Having said that, however, it does seem that institutions operating on 
urban, metropolitan or national scales determine much of what happens on neighbourhood 
scales, whereas it is not clear that the reverse is the case. This may be 
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because we do not understand enough about the dynamics of neighbourhoods or 
neighbourhood governance and how this dynamics affects outcomes on ‘higher’ 
scales (see Somerville et al., 2009, for further discussion). 
Neighbourhood Multiscalarity in England 
In order to improve understanding of some of the issues relating to community or 
neighbourhood governance in England, the Policy Studies Research Centre at the 
University of Lincoln carried out research in 2006, with the assistance of a grant 
from the Economic and Social Research Council. The research was particularly 
interested in co-governance and had three strands or stages relevant to this article. 
The findings from the first stage were reported in Somerville and Haines (2008) – 
this article covers findings from the second and third stages. 
The first stage involved telephone interviews with spokespersons for 43 local 
authorities or local strategic partnerships to identify and explore those where 
co-governance structures and processes were most developed. The spokespersons 
were senior officers and senior councillors with responsibility for developing 
co-governance (including some council leaders and chief executives), and chief 
executives and relevant officers working for local strategic partnerships. 
In the second stage, telephone interviews were conducted with spokespersons 
for 19 parish and town councils10 (together with spokespersons for their 23 
principal councils) that appeared to be at the ‘cutting edge’ of co-governance 
or seemed to be occupying an unusual position (e.g. in terms of their isolation or 
relationship with their principal council). These councils and their spokespersons 
(who were parish/town council chairs and clerks) were identified through the first 
stage of interviews and also on the basis of research conducted by the National 
Association of Local Councils (2003–5). 
Finally, spokespersons for 39 community-based organisations of different 
kinds were contacted that appeared to offer some prospect of assuming the 
mantle of a ‘recognised neighbourhood body’ (Hilder, 2006) for governance 
purposes. These organisations were identified through the initial stages of the 
interviews and secondary data analysis (see Hilder, 2006; Sullivan and Howard, 
2005). They included New Deal for Communities projects (NDCs) (6), 
Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders (NMPs) (6), other neighbourhood management 
and partnership initiatives (6), community housing organisations (8), 
tenant management organisations (4), community/residents’ associations (6) 
and development trusts (2). The spokespersons were chief executives or other 
responsible officers. 
On scale 1, as expected the research did not identify any neighbourhood 
governance bodies but did find a variety of organisations that might be described 
as having neighbourhood governance potential. For example, in relation to recent 
government policy on anti-social behaviour, there was the potential for 
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community groups on this scale such as tenants’ and residents’ associations to 
take on an integration and representation role (for example, to make neighbourhoods 
‘cleaner, safer and greener’ by ‘taking a stand’ – Home Office, 2006), and 
to create ‘a framework of conditions that help residents to be neighbourly when 
and if they want to be’ (Buonfino and Hilder, 2006: 29). The research also 
identified a number of primary housing co-operatives, which were vertically 
integrated with secondary co-operatives (for example, Coin Street Community 
Builders – CSCB – and Redditch Co-operative Homes). These arrangements 
provided interesting examples of co-ordination across scales, but did not 
appear to amount to neighbourhood governance. Indeed, the Group Director of 
CSCB categorically confirmed this in an email: ‘We are clear that the job of each 
Board [of Directors] is to ensure that the organisation effectively meets needs as 
opposed to representing the community.’ 
On scale 2, a number of self-governing bodies were identified, which appeared 
to be mobilised when the neighbourhood community experienced a serious external 
threat, for example, of demolition or destruction of local amenities (CSCB in 
Lambeth, The Eldonians in Liverpool, Walterton & Elgin Community Homes – 
WECH – in Westminster or Witton Lodge in Birmingham). These bodies were 
largely community-based housing associations or community associations, plus a 
few tenant management organisations (TMOs). Such bodies, however, as in the 
case of CSCB, do not necessarily represent the neighbourhood in which they 
operate, so may not be neighbourhood governance bodies. The best candidate for 
a neighbourhood governance body on this scale (and increasingly on scale 3) is 
probably The Eldonians (see www.eldonians.org.uk) because of the breadth and 
depth of its activities on behalf of the neighbourhood of Vauxhall, covering not 
only housing development and estate management but launching initiatives such 
as neighbourhood wardens, a sports centre, a children’s centre, a village hall, 
intermediate labour market projects, and an increasing variety of consultancy 
work – in particular, representing the neighbourhood in arenas on higher scales 
(urban, regional and national). WECH and Witton Lodge, however, would also 
count as neighbourhood governance bodies in that they have significantly shaped 
their respective neighbourhoods and represent them elsewhere, in particular on an 
urban scale. 
On scale 3, four main types of governance body were found: governmental 
authorities such as town and parish councils; national and municipal governmental 
initiatives such as New Deal for Communities projects (NDCs), 
Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders (NMPs), Sure Start, and neighbourhood 
partnership initiatives; multi-purpose community/residents’ associations; and 
single-purpose housing organisations such as tenant management organisations 
(TMOs). 
Of these four types, the governmental authorities are most easily classified as 
neighbourhood governance structures. Parish and town councils are classic 
instances of neighbourhood self-governance, shaping and representing the 
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collectivity of residents in a parish or town. Their scale was actually found to vary 
from 2 to 3. Typically, town councils operated on scale 3, while parish councils 
operated on a scalar continuum from 2 to 3 – many parish councils were larger 
than what local residents regarded as their home neighbourhood (scale 2) but 
smaller than what principal councils regarded as suitable for neighbourhood governance 
(scale 3). Parish/town councils were also involved in a wide range of 
forms of co-governance (‘partnerships’) on scale 3, in which parish/town councillors 
and officers interacted on a more or less equal basis with other interest 
groups and organisations in the area. Partly due to their democratic legitimacy, 
council representatives expressed a certain frustration that they had so little control 
of major services such as health, education, highways and youth services. 
This was particularly the case with those councils that already provided a wide 
range of services of their own.11 
Scale 3 organisations that did have responsibilities for managing or at least 
influencing major services were all governmental initiatives but many were not 
run by democratically elected boards and, where they were, it was not always 
clear how close the elected representatives were to their electorates. A particular 
problem here was that these bodies had been created by national government and 
did not necessarily correspond with the perceptions, needs, aspirations, diversity 
of those living in their areas in terms of their boundaries, objectives, modes of 
working, and so on. They were neighbourhood governance bodies only in the 
sense that they were set up to shape the neighbourhood and represent it to government, 
perhaps for the purposes of containment (Lepine et al., 2007: 13). 
Consequently, hierarchical governance could tend to dominate unless residents 
offered sufficiently strong resistance – as in the case of resident-controlled NDCs 
with strong roots in community activism (e.g. Marsh Farm, Luton, which is 
attempting to run workplaces and enterprises democratically – see Jenkins, 
2006; and Bradford Trident, which is transforming into an urban parish 
council).12 
In contrast, community and residents’ associations tended to be grassroots 
organisations with inclusive memberships, occupying autonomous spaces outside 
of governmental structures. Like town and parish councils, they were instances of 
self-governance, but were part of the third sector rather than the public sector. 
They were mainly focused on the economic development of their neighbourhoods 
and finding ways by which such development could be sustained. To this end, 
they worked in partnership with a wide variety of organisations, including local 
authorities, NDCs, NMPs, and so on. Most of them were concerned with neighbourhood 
governance, but mainly as a means to this end. Some of them, such as 
Royds in Bradford and The Eldonians in Liverpool, enjoyed a national profile, 
with far-reaching effects in representing and shaping their neighbourhoods, particularly 
in regenerating them and reducing worklessness among their residents.13 
Finally, there were examples of resident-controlled housing associations 
(where the majority of the board are elected by the residents) and larger TMOs 
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on scale 3, which were also forms of self-governance. Like the other bodies on 
this scale, they worked in partnership with a variety of organisations and, like 
other housing associations, they could play an important role as ‘community 
anchors’ (DCLG, 2004; Wadhams, 2006). Although specialising in housing management, 
they were capable of representing the concerns of the neighbourhood as 
a whole. For example, Beechdale Housing Association in Walsall is controlled by 
its tenants and the association works with other organisations in improving and 
regenerating the neighbourhood. As a spokesperson said: ‘We think of Beechdale 
as a neighbourhood, represented by Beechdale Housing Association.’ The Chair 
of the association represents the neighbourhood in other arenas such as the local 
regeneration partnership and the local authority. 
Working across scales was an interesting feature of some organisations. The 
research uncovered several organisations (all community associations and resident-led 
bodies) where a scale 3 territory was divided into a number of different 
scale 2 areas, each of which had its own representation on the scale 3 board, in 
proportion to the size of its population. This federated structure seemed to be an 
effective way to ensure that governance was democratic across scales by preventing 
elected representatives from being ‘captured’ by power on ‘higher’ scales. 
Federation therefore appeared to be an important tool for ‘scaling up’ self-governance, 
potentially to scale 4 and above, and achieving new forms of co-governance 
on these ‘higher’ scales. The research also identified examples of areas 
where smaller parish councils (on scale 2) were clustering, or being encouraged 
to cluster, to form governance bodies on scale 3, to achieve improved delivery of 
public services and to enter into co-governance arrangements.14 
All scale 3 neighbourhood governance bodies in the research, therefore, either 
had in place, or were in the process of developing, co-governance arrangements 
with other bodies operating on the same scale. Their relationships with bodies on 
‘higher’ scales (particularly municipal, regional and national), however, were 
often characterised by hierarchy rather than by co-governance. This can be 
seen most clearly in the case of the governmental initiatives, which are of 
course accountable to their relevant government departments, but it appeared 
that parish and town councils too operated largely in the shadow of decisions 
made by their principal councils, and the activities of the housing organisations 
had to accord with detailed guidelines set by legislation and regulator bodies. It 
appeared, therefore, that only the community and residents’ associations, positioned 
and organised outside of governmental structures on any scale, had sufficient 
freedom of manoeuvre to resist governmental forces. This is perhaps only to 
be expected, considering the general persistence of oligarchy that pervades governmental 
structures, which has been noted by many political theorists (see, for 
example, Somerville, 2005). 
Returning to the literature discussed earlier in this article, we can now see that 
one of the key features of the relationship between state and non-state actors, 
between ‘professionals’ and ‘laity’, ‘policy makers’ and ‘citizens’, ‘officials’ and 
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‘the public’, ‘government’ and ‘communities’, and so on, is that the two sides 
operate largely on different scales. The commonly found asymmetry between the 
two sides occurs not just because the non-state actors in many cases lack their 
own separate power base in popular spaces but also because they are not organised 
on ‘higher’ scales. Community and residents’ associations are typically 
organised on scales 2 and 3 and may lack representation on scales higher than 
this (the most successful ones have been active on a national scale). In contrast, 
professionals and politicians are typically organised on municipal, regional and 
national scales. Greater symmetry is required, therefore, to ensure that forms of 
co-governance or even self-governance do not degenerate into hierarchical 
governance. 
To this end, non-state actors have to be supported to integrate horizontally as 
well as vertically, by forming alliances with similar groupings on the same scale 
but in other neighbourhoods, and then ensuring representation of all the groupings 
in these neighbourhoods on higher scales. Attempts have been made to 
achieve such integration on scale 4, for example, through government-initiated 
Community Empowerment Networks (CENs). If successful, this could mean the 
possibility of co-governance on scale 4 in which CENs work together with other 
organisations in a Local Strategic Partnership in a process of mutual shaping and 
representation. In practice, however, the price of governmental support tends to 
be a certain loss of independence. 
A final question concerns the point in the process of scaling up at which selfgovernance 
through representation becomes transformed into hierarchical governance. 
An important lesson from the research reported here, as well as from the 
literature more generally, is that the power of hierarchical governance comes from 
its capacity for (top-down) vertical trans-scalar integration: the fragmentation of 
action on ‘lower’ scales makes it continually vulnerable to domination by action 
on ‘higher’ scales. In contrast, vertical integration across scales from the bottomup 
is far more difficult to achieve, mainly because a degree of horizontal integration 
is required on each scale before action can be ‘scaled up’ to the next. 
Consequently, when, for example, a set of self-governing community groups on 
scale 2 elect representatives to a body on scale 3, there is always a risk that the 
scale 3 body will make decisions that are subsequently imposed on the scale 2 
groups unless all these groups have already formed their own separate collectivity 
(e.g. a federation). Self-governance on the ‘lower’ scales is therefore safeguarded 
by such forms of horizontal integration organised separately from governance 
bodies on the ‘higher’ scales. The result is that the latter governance bodies 
co-operate with the federations of scale 2 groups in forms of co-governance 
(see, for example, Somerville and Haines, 2008, on the embryonic co-operation 
between scale 2 parish councils and their principal councils on scale 4). In the 
absence of such safeguards, of course, it is likely that the representatives of the 
‘lower’ scale groups will become ‘captured’ by the more powerful forces operating 
on ‘higher’ scales. 
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One of the referees of an earlier version of this article raised the interesting 
question whether this ‘capturing’ is a matter of size rather than scale. As this 
referee pointed out, however, small groups can be very powerful while large 
groups can be very weak. The greater power of ‘higher’ scale organisation 
appears to come not from its greater size but precisely from the greater capacity, 
and possibly ‘efficiency’, of its scale of operations. Hierarchical governance on a 
‘higher’ scale simply presumes or orders a coordination of activity on ‘lower’ 
scales, whereas scaling up self-governance requires that activities on ‘lower’ 
scales be first coordinated with one another before they can be represented effectively 
on ‘higher’ scales. 
Conclusion 
Research findings and arguments used in this article from a variety of countries, 
but particularly from England, indicate that, far from being a simple, taken for 
granted feature of everyday life, neighbourhoods are complex and multi-layered. 
Specifically, they are not monoscalar but multiscalar. Recognition of this multiscalarity 
prompts a rethink of current theories of neighbourhood and also of 
governance. 
In order to make sense of the multiscalarity of neighbourhood governance, this 
article has drawn upon Kooiman’s (2005) distinction between hierarchical, selfand 
co-governance. This distinction has made it possible to explain established 
scalar hierarchies by reference to the dominance of hierarchical governance on 
‘higher’ scales. Indeed, it could be that the recurrent assumption of scales as 
‘higher’ or ‘lower’ is itself produced by the increased power of vertical 
co-ordination that is associated with ‘higher’ scales of operation. In contrast, 
where self-governance may predominate on ‘lower’ scales, the task of vertical 
integration is considerably more daunting, requiring as it does an initial Herculean 
labour of horizontal integration. In other words, scaling up is far more difficult 
than scaling down, a finding that may also help to explain the persistence of 
oligarchy (Somerville, 2005). 
Once this is recognised, so much else that is otherwise perplexing seems to fall 
into place. The limitations of current theories of governance can be traced to their 
failure to take full account of neighbourhood multiscalarity, whether this be 
because they over-emphasise the hierarchical governance on ‘higher’ scales or 
the self-governance on ‘lower’ scales or whether it be simply because they misunderstand 
the complex relationship between different modes of governance on 
different scales. With this insight, state rescaling and legitimating strategies can 
perhaps be seen as different kinds of ‘modernising’ response to current global 
changes in the economy and society, with the former focusing on renewing hierarchical 
governance, while the latter is more concerned with developing selfgovernance. 
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On a slightly less negative note, this article has suggested that forms of 
co-governance are indeed possible, where forms of self-governance can develop 
federated structures, through iterative processes of scaling up, even to the ‘highest’ 
scales, and where these federated structures can be strategically linked to corresponding 
governmental structures on each scale. More thought now needs to be 
given as to how such federated structures can be built on scales higher than 4 or 5. 
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Notes 
1. This is perhaps an exception that proves the rule because this was a movement of the 
rich and privileged, whereas most of the literature is concerned with poor and deprived 
communities. 
2. Interestingly, in the case of Sure Start, Barnes et al. (2007: 191) suggest that tensions 
between the different professions involved ‘provided the space for new developments in 
parent engagement to emerge, as community and user-oriented workers established ways 
of interacting with parents and managing meetings in a more inclusive way, while key 
professional groups battled with each other about professional codes and ways of working’. 
3. ‘Double devolution’ is the term given to a process whereby powers are devolved to 
local authorities in return for those authorities devolving more power to communities. 
4. For example, a recent report on neighbourhood governance in the UK (White et al., 
2006: 12–13), following Hilder (2005), identified what appear to be the first three of the 
four scales: streets and blocks of about 50–300 residents; ‘home neighbourhoods’ of 
about 500–2,000 residents; and public neighbourhoods of 4,000–15,000 residents 
(or 5,000–20,000 for neighbourhood partnerships). The fourth scale, however, was not 
considered, because populations beyond 15–20,000 were not deemed to be suitable for 
neighbourhood management. As the national evaluation of the then government’s 
neighbourhood management pathfinder programme expressed it, ‘economies tend to 
peter out for populations larger than 15,000’ (ODPM, 2006: 4). It should also be noted 
that the numbers quoted here suggest that the scales are discrete when in fact there is a 
continuum of scales from the ‘lowest’ to the ‘highest’, and there is bound to be a certain 
degree of overlap between one scale and the next. 
5. These attributes could of course vary according to social class, gender, age, ethnicity, 
et cetera. 
6. Buonfino and Hilder (2006: 31) argue that families with young children are ‘a key 
neighbourhood connector’ here because of the interactions between children from 
different families that occur on this scale. 
7. It is commonly assumed that neighbourhood governance on this scale must always be 
concerned only with matters internal to the neighbourhood, so it may be salutary to 
point out that the territory of the Vatican City State exists on such a scale – an exception 
that perhaps proves the rule, since this is a ‘home neighbourhood’ (only 558 citizens) of 
global importance. 
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8. Melo and Baiocchi (2006: 591), for example, offer at least four different meanings of 
urban governance, none of which theoretically distinguishes it from neighbourhood 
governance: ‘the configuration of interactions between public and private actors with a 
view to achieving collective (not private) goals in a particular territory’; ‘a particular 
configuration in which local political authority plays a less central role and much of 
the coordination and goals are achieved through public-private partnerships and 
interaction’; ‘the ‘‘good’’ management of city resources’; and ‘a complex of local 
practices and collective actions at the city level’. In the last two cases, ‘city’ could be 
replaced by ‘neighbourhood’, indicating a change of scale only. 
9. This shows that attributes of a scale can be socially constructed, but this consideration 
takes us beyond the purposes of this article. 
10. Currently, there are about 8,500 such councils, and a further 2,000 parish meetings, 
differing considerably in size, resources, aspirations and activities (Jones et al., 
2005: 6). Together they employ about 25,000 staff and serve at least 15 million people, 
or about 30 per cent of the population in England (www.nalc.gov.uk). They are found 
in nearly all rural areas but hardly at all in major cities or conurbations, though the 
number in urban areas has grown very slightly in recent years (Bevan, 2003). 
11. Apart from longstanding services of allotments, cemeteries, open spaces, play areas, 
public conveniences, street cleaning, lengthsman schemes (according to which local 
councils direct a highways maintenance team to do certain tasks from a set menu, e.g. 
cut hedges, clean signs, unblock drains) and so on, new services being provided 
included street wardens, activities and facilities for young people, winter gritting, litter 
collection, tourist information centres, pre-school education, developing children’s 
centres, mobile handyperson (‘man in a van’), and outreach youth work. 
12. The argument in this paragraph should not be interpreted as a wholehearted 
endorsement of NDCs. Robinson et al. (2005: 16–17), for example, concluded that, 
although community representatives on NDC boards were probably more representative, 
by ethnicity and gender, than local councillors, ‘they often do not really represent 
the diversity of the local community. In our experience, most partnership boards 
include few people in full-time employment, while younger people are noticeable by 
their absence. Isolated and marginalised groups – the so-called ‘‘hard to reach’’ – are 
often not represented, not reached and their absence goes unnoticed.’ 
13. Royds, for example, relied on three sustainable income sources: its asset base, managed 
by a development trust (consisting of an enterprise park, healthy living centre, 
shops, office block, et cetera); public contracts (for employment and training support, 
neighbourhood wardens, healthy living programme, et cetera); and its residents’ 
consultancy programme, through which it sold its expertise to other community 
groups across England. 
14. The situation is, unfortunately, even more complicated than stated here. One reason for 
this is that the principal councils do not operate only on scale 4 (that of a district 
council) but also on scale 5 (that of a county council). 
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